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ABSTRACT
Indigenous Micronesian political forms closely paral-
lel those of eastern Melanesian and Polynesian societies. 
Chieftainship integrates aspects of land tenure, kin grou-
pings, status hierarchy, and ideologies of the supernatural. 
Because so many aspects of social and political economy 
meet in these institutions, chiely politics have traditio-
nally been responsive to popular pressures; there is in 
fact, if not necessarily in myth, very little that is auto-
cratic about them. he primary debate in the Federated 
States of Micronesia has not been about the importance of 
chieftainship, but whether the people are better served by 
including chiefs within their constitutional government 
or keeping them outside it, where it is believed they can 
more efectively exercise the checks and balances the people 
wish to maintain.
Keywords: Chieftainship, constitutional govern-
ment, Federated States of Micronesia 
RÉSUMÉ
Les formes politiques indigènes de Micronésie sont très proches 
de celles des sociétés de Polynésie et de Mélanésie de l’est. La 
cheferie intègre certains aspects de la propriété foncière, des 
groupements de parenté, des statuts hiérarchiques et des idéolo-
gies de la surnature. Dans la mesure où ces institutions sont à 
la croisée de tant d’aspects de l’économie sociale et politique, les 
politiques menées par les chefs tendent, traditionnellement, à 
tenir compte des pressions populaires ; quoi qu’en dise le mythe, 
dans les faits, elles ne sont que très marginalement autocra-
tiques. Le débat central parmi les États fédérés de Micronésie 
ne concerne donc pas l’importance de la cheferie, mais la ques-
tion de savoir si le peuple a intérêt à ce que le gouvernement 
constitutionnel inclut les chefs, ou s’il vaut mieux les en exclure, 
partant du principe qu’il sont mieux placés pour garantir le 
contrôle et le contre-point que le peuple souhaite maintenir.
Mots-clés : cheferie, governement constitution-
nel, États fédérés de Micronésie 
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hough Micronesian societies’ traditional go-
vernments have their roots in cultural history 
shared with Fiji and Polynesia, they do not attract 
much attention. his is unfortunate, because 
there is much to be learned from Micronesians’ 
experiences integrating the dynamics of chief-
tainship with parliamentary rule. My aim here 
is to describe key aspects of traditional Microne-
sian polities, to explore some of the reasons why 
Micronesians have opted to retain these, and 
to challenge claims that such traditional forms 
and practices are inherently incompatible with 
European-based socio-political forms. here just 
may be some proit in comparing Micronesian 
responses to the dilemma of maintaining chiely 
politics in an era that loudly, if not necessarily 
scrupulously, shouts out the inevitability of de-
mocracy, or at least quasi-democratic forms.
During the course of the irst millennium bce, 
voyaging peoples made the leap from Near Ocea-
nia to Remote Oceania, heading out from the So-
lomon Islands, east (to Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa), 
south (to what are now known as Vanuatu and 
New Caledonia), and north (to Pohnpei and Kos-
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political scientists attribute to the modern nation-
state, Westphalian-based international relations, 
and Grotian political theory. here is perhaps 
even greater irony in the specter of metropolitan 
powers insisting on replication of their own poli-
tical practices as a condition of decolonization.
Underlying my approach here is my sense that in 
everyday life virtually all systems of politics and go-
vernment operate at some degree of variance from 
whatever theoretical frameworks they are supposed 
to be based upon. (“Utopia”, that is, a place where 
there is absolute coherence between the theory and 
practice of government, exists, in homas More’s 
original sense of the word, “no place”). Contem-
porary state-organized governments are inherently 
neither more nor less likely to perform according to 
theory than chieftainships, and problems attribu-
ted to the alleged ineiciencies and inequalities of 
chieftainship are likely to be the result of conlicts 
between competing forms of government, rather 
than the necessary consequence of one type of go-
vernment or another.
Some elements of Micronesian socio-
political organization 
Traditional social life in Micronesia is characte-
rized by the region’s dispersed matrilineal clans, 
which exist virtually everywhere in the area2. As 
I have demonstrated at length in Traditional Mi-
cronesian Societies (Petersen, 2009), these seem to 
have irst taken form on Pohnpei and Kosrae in 
the eastern Carolines, then difused to the rest of 
the Micronesian islands, probably because of the 
adaptive advantages they confer in a region that 
is home to the western Paciic’s typhoon spaw-
ning grounds and beset by enso-driven droughts. 
he dispersed character of the clans means that 
on each Micronesian island or community are 
resident subclans and lineages of multiple clans, 
and each clan has subclans and lineages planted 
on multiple islands and communities. Ethnologi-
cal accounts tend to stress Micronesia’s matriliny 
as its key distinction, but it is in fact the dispersed 
nature of these descent groups that is most salient.
hese clans and lineages are in classical ethnolo-
gical terms “conical” in organization and in fact it 
the archetypal model of conical clans, developed 
by Marshall Sahlins (1958, 1968) and reined by 
Patrick Kirch (1989), even more closely than Po-
lynesia’s descent groups. he clans, along with the 
lineages that constitute them, have multiple func-
tions and characteristics, but for present purposes 
two of these are of greatest relevance: the ways 
in which clans that successfully assert settlement 
rae). here must have been multiple voyages in 
each direction, conducted by several diferent but 
closely related populations, and these peoples car-
ried with them a range of interrelated languages, 
cultural beliefs, and social practices. he modern 
populations of Eastern Melanesia, Fiji, Polyne-
sia, and most of Micronesia are descended from 
these ancestral stocks and for all the apparent 
diferences in their languages, cultures, and socie-
ties, they manifest important and fundamental 
commonalities1. he overarching socio-political 
form scholars refer to as chieftainship thrives eve-
rywhere in these islands and plays a central orga-
nizing role in the social lives of their peoples.
Each of these societies has undergone not only 
its own speciic historical developments but also 
experienced ongoing and recurring linkages with 
the societies of multiple other islands. Because 
they also share some fundamental precepts and 
because they must ultimately provide viable go-
vernments to their peoples, it possible to point 
to certain recurring themes. Among these are 
notions of deep and indelible ties between lea-
ders and land; leaders’ status rooted in kin groups; 
precedence within and between groups based to 
some extent on seniority of descent; dynamic ties 
between leaders and the natural and supernatural 
worlds (often known by some cognate of “mana”); 
and reciprocal notions that gifts must be given to 
leaders for both religious and practical reasons and 
that leaders must bestow gifts on their constituents 
for similar reasons. here exist everywhere in the 
region well-developed ideologies of hierarchy 
or rank, but the behavioral signs of hierarchical 
organization vary greatly, from quasi-egalitarian 
to seemingly authoritarian. In all these societies, 
however, no matter how despotic they seem to 
be, multiple checks and balances are provided 
by variant versions of key mythological charters, 
competition for status within and between kin 
groups laying claim to chiely positions, rivalries 
for local precedence, and the practical exigencies 
of demography, political and martial skills, and 
idiosyncrasies of individual personalities.
Many foreign political scientists, as well as some 
members of these societies, argue that the govern-
mental institutions comprising chieftainship are 
fundamentally incompatible with the state-or-
ganized and more or less democratic political 
processes introduced into the islands by foreign 
colonial governments. his perspective seems ab-
surd on its face, since there are not many political 
processes less democratic than the forcible impo-
sition of foreign rule, but this contradiction has 
not kept scholars and bureaucrats from decrying 
the benighted politics of chieftainship as consti-
tuting the greatest impediment to the salvation 
1. Palau and the Marianas were settled from the west a nd Yap probably from the south, but these societies were 
profoundly afected by inluences from the Eastern Carolines (Petersen, 2006). 
2. Even Kiribati has clear evidence of matrilineal clans pre-existing more recent inluences from Samoa. 
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On the high islands, with much larger (though 
not necessarily denser) populations than the atolls, 
hierarchies based on genealogical seniority and sett-
lement priority can become quite elaborate. Smal-
ler, local communities with their own cross-cutting 
chiely hierarchies are subsumed into larger para-
mount chiefdoms that may include dozens of these 
smaller units, sometimes with intermediate-level 
groupings as well. Competition among the larger 
chiefdoms resulted in increasing levels of organi-
zation, and additional forms of rank developed, 
including but by no means limited to specialists of 
many kinds. On some of the largest islands, inclu-
ding Pohnpei, Yap, and Palau, federations appeared.
Moreover, all these communities and societies 
maintained patterns of councils where, depending 
on population size and other factors, either the en-
tire adult population or representative leaders from 
lineages were free to speak their minds. While Mi-
cronesian political styles call for low-key discussions 
in public venues (indeed, Palauans refer to politi-
cal discourse as “whispering”), the ability to gauge 
public opinion is considered a vital element of com-
petent leadership, a point to which I shall return. 
he multiple and cross-cutting lines of authori-
ty in Micronesian communities thus produce an 
efective series of and checks and balances. hese 
were thoroughly formalized in some societies; on 
Pohnpei, for instance, there were three parallel 
lines of chiely titles within each of the para-
mount chiefdoms, each with its own source of 
authority enabling it to confront and challenge 
the others under certain circumstances. 
It is also the case, of course, that violence, on the 
part of both individuals and groups, had a signi-
icant role in Micronesian political life. Stories of 
assassinations of chiefs are not unusual and ser-
ved to remind leaders of the dangers that abusive 
behaviors can pose, as well as threats from rival 
(especially junior) kinsmen. Moreover, local oral 
histories, ethnohistoric accounts, and ethnogra-
phic reports tell us that warfare was a signiicant 
factor in Micronesian life. It is my own sense 
(Petersen 2014) that the many aspects of martial 
spirit that run through Micronesian culture – and 
this is especially seen in the many forms of dance 
performances that incorporate forms of mock 
combat – are intended to warn potential foes that 
a community is able to protect itself at least as 
much as they are evidence that Micronesian com-
munities spent a good deal of time and energy 
actually engaged in combat. In many Microne-
sian societies, war leaders possess rank, status, and 
authority that is distinct from leaders whose au-
thority is based on genealogical ties to ancestors. 
Again we encounter the separation of powers, 
which in turn provides checks and balances.
A much broader point follows from this. Mi-
cronesian political rhetoric combines emphases on 
both humility and the power of leaders. Chiefs are 
simultaneously accorded the greatest respect and 
priority on any island or in any community pro-
vide chiefs for all the other groups residing there, 
and ways in which the ambiguities of genealogical 
seniority promote efective leadership within the 
ruling lineages and communities. 
A fundamental precept of Micronesian life is 
that the irst kin group to settle an area or island 
thereby establishes title over it. But in Epeli 
Hau’ofa’s sense of a “sea of islands,” Micronesia 
has always been a sea of immigrants, as its cha-
racteristic dispersed clan pattern clearly demons-
trates. he nature of Micronesian communities 
relects the fact that they survive only by creating 
and maintaining close ties to other islands and 
communities. his means that even though the 
irst settlers and their descendants claim (and are 
usually believed to possess) fairly well-established 
title to the land, they need to attract new mem-
bers with ties to other places. According to both 
Micronesian mythology and reality, nearly eve-
ryone has come from somewhere else. But after 
arriving, visiting voyagers can quickly become 
settlers, even while retaining ties to fellow clan 
members in the communities from whence they 
came (which is of course the reason they are en-
couraged to settle). he primary means of enti-
cing visiting voyagers to settle is to provide them 
with rights to land. Having received title to the 
lands they settle, newly arrived groups are made 
to feel secure enough to remain and to thus share 
with the resident population the advantages of 
their ties to other islands and communities. 
his is why in virtually all Micronesian societies 
there exist dual kinds of titles to land, the rights 
claimed by the irst settlers (“residual” rights in 
Goodenough’s 1951 terminology) and the rights 
claimed by the later occupants who actually reside 
on and cultivate the land (“provisional” rights). 
In other words, a community seeks new mem-
bers precisely because they bring with them ties 
to other places, ties the original settlers hope to 
multiply in order to improve their community’s 
security. But because the new settlers bring with 
them already-existing clan and lineage organiza-
tion, they possess already-established patterns of 
hierarchical relations. hat is, in order for Mi-
cronesian communities to persist and thrive they 
must incorporate competing organizations.
In each and every Micronesian community 
there are two cross-cutting forms of chiely au-
thority. here is the territorial chief, who is head 
of the kin group – clan or lineage – that claims 
to have originally settled the land, and then there 
are also the chiefs of all the other kin groups that 
have subsequently settled there. Micronesian 
communities have, almost by deinition, mul-
tiple chiefs who derive their authority from dife-
ring sources, some from the land and some from 
their kin groups. Simple checks and balances, 
then, are inherent in the nature of Micronesian 
socio-political organization.
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succession is often disputed. he ensuing rivalries 
in turn generate the sorts of competitive practices 
that low from the status anxiety Irving Goldman 
(1955, 1970) long ago described in Polynesian 
societies. Would-be leaders must continually 
prove themselves; they are rarely entirely comfor-
table with their claims to titles; and together with 
close family members and allies they must engage 
almost ceaselessly in the competitive feasting that 
characterizes so much of public life. 
In Micronesia this status ambiguity is only some-
times a matter of public record, but it plays conti-
nually behind the scenes, and in combination with 
the dual and often ambiguous notions about land 
tenure it contributes materially to the dynamic 
character of chieftainship I am describing here. 
Land and Political heory 
Complex webs of ideas, assumptions, and histo-
rical traditions shape relations among Microne-
sian land tenure, lineages, chieftainship, and 
political life in general. But this richly textured 
fabric does not, in fact, difer all that much from 
aspects of European and American political tra-
ditions. I turn for a moment to Western political 
thought in order to provide a context for unders-
tanding some of the subtleties of Micronesian 
life. he era of the English Revolution provides 
modern political theory with much of its basis for 
considering relations between property – or more 
speciically, land – and political life. In Two Trea-
tises of Government John Locke provided both his 
contemporaries and subsequent generations of 
thinkers with some timeless arguments regarding 
the appropriate nature of government. In his irst 
treatise Locke challenged arguments in support of 
what is now known as “the divine right of kings.” 
his notion held that the legitimacy of the king’s 
rule derived from his authority over all the realm’s 
lands as a consequence of his succession from 
Adam, to whom God had granted dominion over 
all the earth. Rather than directly disputing the 
speciic character of a king’s antecedents, Locke 
instead denied that “Property in Land gives a Man 
Power over the Life of another” and reasoned that 
“no Man could ever have a just Power over the 
Life of another, by Right of property in Land or 
Possessions” (Locke, 1960: 205-206, I.iv, 41-42). 
In the second treatise Locke developed this prin-
ciple further, maintaining that 
« every Man has a Property in his own Person […]. 
he Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, 
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he then re-
moves out of the State that Nature hath provided, and 
expected to behave with true modesty. here are, 
of course, exceptions to this, but tensions between 
status and humility are fundamental to nearly eve-
ry aspect of Micronesian socio-political style.
Seniority 
here is a second way in which Micronesian clan 
organization shapes the nature of political life and, 
again, this derives from an older Oceanic pattern. 
I am referring to the ways in which ambiguities 
of genealogical seniority promote efective leader-
ship within the ruling lineages and communities. 
Micronesian political theory stresses the impor-
tance of seniority of descent, as is typical of coni-
cal clan organization, but precisely because this 
principle has inluence on so many aspects of life 
it possesses signiicant potential for doing harm. 
If chiely succession were entirely automatic, and 
birth order was its sole determinant, then com-
munities would face the recurring danger of ha-
ving incompetent heirs occupying crucial leader-
ship positions. hey would ind themselves with 
chiefs unable to guide them, or to listen thought-
fully to wise counsel. While a great many factors 
determine the actual processes of succession, one 
fundamental contradiction in the process pro-
vides the ambiguity and tension necessary to truly 
dynamic political life. And that is the ambiguity 
inherent in Micronesian concepts of seniority.
hese concepts depend on competing notions of 
what in English can be glossed as “older.” I have 
heard Pohnpeians, when pushed beyond custo-
mary reticence into asserting a right of authority, 
say, “Ngehi me laud.” hey could mean by this “I 
am senior” or “I am older,” meaning either that 
they are genealogically closer to an apical ances-
tor or chronologically older than the individuals 
they aare sserting their claims against. hat is, in 
a matrilineal society there are built-in ambiguities 
or tensions between an older, genealogically senior 
woman’s younger brothers and her sons. Her bro-
thers are a generation older than their sisters’ sons, 
while at the same time her sons are genealogically 
senior to their mothers’ younger brothers. Each 
category can legitimately claim to be senior to the 
other. And despite many claims to the contrary 
by interested individuals, both methods of recko-
ning who is senior – genealogy and chronology 
– are regularly asserted by pretenders to a chiely 
title3. While this may seem in the abstract to be 
a somewhat trivial distinction, it is in fact utterly 
central to much of political life. Because there are 
almost always several potential successors to an 
important title as a result of this ambiguity, chiely 
3. When I irst began to encounter signiicant diferences of opinion about who was considered rightful successor to 
a title, I naively assumed that this was because people no longer understood their own cultural rules. I came in time to 
understand instead that these diferences are what make the system survive and thrive. 
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chiely lineage’s claims over land derive from 
priority of settlement and descent, the claims of 
lineages residing upon this same land derive from 
the labor they have invested in it. And although 
Micronesians readily attest to the chief ’s autho-
rity over the land, they are equally vocal about 
the lineage’s rights over it. A chief cannot alie-
nate a lineage’s land – remove it from them or 
drive them of it – unless there is an overriding 
consensus within the community that the lineage 
has done something socially unacceptable or 
reprehensible to bring this upon themselves, or 
clearly and repeatedly failed to discharge their ac-
knowledged duties to the chief. As Goodenough 
notes, in Chuuk there may arise 
« a situation in which powerful persons and lineages 
could take advantage of weaker ones. While this has 
happened, the entire community is likely to unite 
against a too frequent ofender » (1951: 60)
In short, there are two difering Micronesian 
concepts regarding land rights, and the nature 
of Micronesian political thought cannot be un-
derstood unless both these viewpoints are com-
prehended simultaneously. Unfortunately, most 
of those who have reported on Micronesian 
chieftainship and land tenure have assumed that 
the Micronesian statements about chiely autho-
rity and dominion that resonate with European 
conceptions of the divine rights of kings consti-
tute the totality of the Micronesian perspective. 
And thus Micronesian chiefs are commonly por-
trayed as being in possession of rather awesome 
authority. But closer examination of the dyna-
mics of Micronesian sociopolitical life tends to 
belie this stereotype. he only way to make sense 
of this disparity is to recognize the simultaneous 
existence of these two contrary notions.
Locke’s notion in the second treatise was that 
land became property – was separated out from 
nature – by the labor of those who worked it, 
and that property was thus imbued with the per-
sonality of those who created it. Land belonged 
to those who cultivated it and could not rightly 
or justly be taken from them. In order to pre-
vent the unjust taking of land by those who were 
stronger, individual property owners joined toge-
ther to create governments, the original purpose 
of which was to protect the property of those 
who consented to join together and thus foun-
ded the government. His logic lies at the heart 
of subsequent theories of the “social contract”, 
that is, that people consent to government and 
can therefore withdraw their consent and the-
reby act to change the government. 
In the same vein, James Harrington, drawing 
from Machiavelli’s claim that it was the pos-
session of arms that assured people their rights 
as political actors, and writing in the same era, 
insisted that the right to bear arms was in turn 
left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned 
it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it 
his Property. » (Locke, 1960: 328-329, II.v.27)
hat is, humans create property by conjoining 
their own labor with nature.
It is necessary to stress here that there have been 
periods – eras, in fact – when republican and mo-
narchical principles coexisted, as they also do in 
many contemporary Paciic island societies. As 
Pocock’s he Machiavellian Moment (1975) fully 
demonstrates, aspects of both these contrasting 
outlooks informed western political discourse 
for centuries. Within a single European society, 
then, there were competing notions about rela-
tionships between government and property. 
While these are not identical with Micronesian 
perspectives on connections between chiely 
government and property rights, they draw on 
strikingly similar assumptions: concurrent, com-
peting notions about rights conferred by heredi-
tary succession and by actually working the land.
Similar precepts inform traditional Microne-
sian society. While the authority and the rights 
of chiefs are sometimes attributed to conquest 
(especially in the Marshalls), in general the 
authority that inheres in a Micronesian chief 
by virtue of his oice is rooted in his descent 
from ancestors who were the irst to occupy or 
settle an island or place. Almost everywhere we 
ind that a community’s leading lineage or clan 
claims that its legitimacy as the pre-eminent 
group derives from this settlement priority, and 
the community’s chief is chief by virtue of being 
head of its leading descent group. he concept 
of residual title over land bears this out. What 
is owed to a chief – irst fruits, respect, and, in 
some circumstances and to some degree, obe-
dience – is owed to him because of his group’s 
precedence. he chief ’s eminence comes because 
of his status as a senior member of the senior 
group. Both the importance of seniority of des-
cent and the importance of residual title over the 
land are cited by nearly every Micronesian when 
discussing why a chief is a chief, what privileges a 
chief is due, and what responsibilities encumber 
him. Whatever disagreements Micronesians may 
have about what constitutes chieftainship, and 
about which individual should occupy the oice 
(and there are many), they all know intuitively 
how and why one is supposed to become a chief.
At the same time, we can see a shared notion 
that the descent groups that occupy land – the 
people who work it, improve it, and derive their 
lives and identities from it – are also its rightful 
proprietors. And there is a common notion that 
the land derives its value from the work that a 
lineage, and more important, its ancestors, has 
put into developing and improving it, making 
it productive farmland, keep it yielding a living 
to those who continue to cultivate it. While the 
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does capture the underlying tension between the 
honor and deference chiefs receive, on the one 
hand, and the sense of individual and lineage 
autonomy, on the other, that together charac-
terize Micronesian political dynamics. Ten-
sions between the rights and responsibilities of 
government and the rights and responsibilities 
of individuals and families are characteristic of 
political life everywhere, and constitute the basic 
roots of the checks and balances that are the very 
stuf of politics. he essential similarities among 
what appear on the surface to be quite diferent 
forms of government are not always well under-
stood by political scientists.
Criticism of contemporary chieftainship 
Stephanie Lawson’s Tradition versus Democracy 
in the South Paciic (1996) provides one of the 
most systematic critiques of the roles chiefs play 
in present-day Paciic islands governments. Law-
son examines the contemporary workings of 
government in Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa, 
seeking to demonstrate that “traditionalist em-
phasis” on chiefs, monarchy, and matai in these 
societies enhances and enforces the continuing 
rule of elites. “he concept of tradition,” she says, 
« is one of the most important components of an 
ideological arsenal which has been used to counter 
the development of more democratic norms of politi-
cal conduct and organization. »
In her view, indigenous claims about the conti-
nuing signiicance of tradition serve largely to 
preserve elite power and privilege against claims 
to “more extensive opportunities for participa-
tion” on the part of “those without traditionally 
derived political or social status” (1996: 5, Law-
son’s emphasis).
Underlying Lawson’s treatment is a misap-
prehension about the presence and character 
of participatory politics as a key element in the 
dynamics of chieftainship. Arguing that “a subs-
tantial part of the history of democratic develop-
ment in the West has been about depersonali-
zing political power, and vesting it in impersonal 
institutions,” she contrasts the island polities in 
her case studies as marked by 
« a much stronger personalized element in the asser-
tion of tradition since its most authoritative bearers 
are those whose status is largely (although not exclu-
sively) ascribed. » (1996: 12) 
dependent upon individuals’ secure status as 
owners of their own land4. A monarch exer-
cises limited sway over land-holding people, 
and they are not obliged to ight for him – their 
arms are their own. Forms of government rou-
ghly approximating democracy were possible 
only where people held land in relative equality. 
Under these circumstances, citizens possessed 
the human resources needed to disperse political 
authority in a diversiied and balanced way and 
were thereby enabled to establish and preserve a 
stable polity. his in turn assured land holders 
security of tenure; they could pass their land on 
to their descendants, who were in turn assured 
not only of a place in political life, but also of the 
means through which to participate actively in 
it (Harrington, 1992; Pocock, 1975: 386-390).
In a pre-industrial society based on a subsis-
tence economy, each lineage’s rights over its own 
land enables its members to function as political 
actors. Under normal circumstances, resident li-
neages’ relationships with the community’s chief 
are deined by the lineages actual tenure over 
their land and possession of their own arms. In 
Micronesian societies, every adult male is a po-
tential warrior, as well as a freeholder, and chiefs 
are obliged to listen and to heed. hroughout 
Micronesia public politics are conducted via 
councils composed of the heads of all the local li-
neages. Freedom of speech seems to be the norm, 
inasmuch as these councils engage in considera-
tion of public business until all have expressed 
what they wish to say and then work hard to 
achieve consensus before any action is taken. 
Finally, and most signiicantly, the tension 
between these two seemingly opposing political 
themes – of chiely rights based on hereditary au-
thority over land and lineage rights based on who 
works on the land – appears to relect another 
central tenet of classical republican theory. By 
acknowledging their chief ’s authority over their 
land, Micronesian lineages assure themselves 
that he will also be responsible for protecting it. 
And because the chief is the leader of the entire 
community, and everyone in it acknowledges 
his authority, a threat to any one lineage’s land 
means the potential mobilization, via the chief, 
of the entire community to defend it. In readily 
acknowledging the chief ’s authority over their 
land, Micronesians are not denying their own 
proprietary rights, but instead, assuring them-
selves of their government’s protection of their 
lands. his is very much, if not precisely, the way 
Locke explained the nature of government. 
It may well be that an interpretation based in 
western political theory does not adequately or 
truly represent Micronesians’ understandings of 
their own political systems. But I believe that it 
4. he reference here is to Machiavelli’s republican ideas (spelled out in he Discourses on Livy), and not to the more 
problematic program outlined in the much better-known he Prince.
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Anyone who has spent much time in Paciic 
island societies knows how rarely one encounters 
unpolitical lives.
his outlook is, I think, the consequence of a 
perspective that overemphasizes the place of insti-
tutions in political life. In this approach, “demo-
cracy” is mostly about government. Yet, democra-
cy is more appropriately – or at least productively 
– understood as something considerably more 
extensive than a type of government. Sheldon 
Wolin, who has devoted his distinguished career 
to the exploration of democratic politics, main-
tains that 
« democracy needs to be reconceived as something 
other than a form of government. » (1996: 43)
James Kloppenburg insists that 
« democracy is not now, nor has it ever been, prima-
rily a question of representative institutions » 
and suggests instead that it be 
« conceived as a way of life rather than a way simply 
of managing conlict and preserving order. »(1995: 
176)
When Lawson does tackle the issue of just 
what it is that constitutes democracy, she ac-
knowledges that the gap between theory and 
practice 
« is just as problematic in the West where democra-
tic institutions have largely failed to deliver on the 
promise of greater equality for the mass of ordinary 
people. » (1996: 27) 
If this is indeed the case (and I certainly be-
lieve that it is), then it seems to me her entire 
argument founders. We are asked to believe that 
Paciic island political cultures are predisposed 
toward personalized and authoritarian govern-
ment and the instrumentalist manipulations 
of modern-day elites that prevent these socie-
ties from reaping the fruits of democratic ins-
titutions introduced by their erstwhile colonial 
rulers. But if the societies in which this western 
political form has arisen cannot themselves pro-
perly or fully implement it, then why are we bla-
ming defects in the societies where it has been 
subsequently introduced for faults that appear to 
be inherent in the form itself?
It is precisely because the organization of daily 
life in most Paciic islands communities fosters 
an overwhelming amount of communication 
among groups of citizens that positions such 
as Lawson’s are troubling. She is particularly 
unhappy with “claims of the ‘democracy-as-in-
digenous’ kind” and the question of whether 
the island nations have “pre-existing democra-
Yet it is clear that in these societies, as in Mi-
cronesia, the most politically salient aspects of 
ascription are commonly seen in the manipu-
lating (or selective reinterpretation) of genealo-
gies after the fact of succession to a chiely title. 
Indeed, I have had Micronesian chiefs explain 
to me that much of clanship’s viability lies pre-
cisely in the broad net of men it makes eligible 
for titles, and this is borne out by ethnographies 
describing situations in which it is obvious that 
ascription is not the most salient factor in ac-
cess to titles (Alkire, 1989: 44-46; Kiste, 1974: 
52; Petersen, 1982). Lawson makes the error of 
granting unquestioning credence to these post 
facto claims, which in fact serve to legitimize, 
rather than prescribe, succession.
On the other hand, she also dismisses as little 
more than instrumentalist maneuvering the 
claims put forward by elites about their rights to 
run things, that is, 
« the manipulation of tradition by indigenous elites 
in ways that enhance their own legitimacy by sanc-
tifying the political order to which they owe their pri-
vilege. » (1996: 12)
Again, I see several problems with this portrayal. 
While it is certainly accurate in some senses, it 
is also a basic truism of social life that is hard-
ly peculiar to Paciic islands politics; her asser-
tions evoke Jeremy Bentham’s powerful diatribe 
against “malefactors in high places” for whom 
“preservation of order is but keeping things in 
the state they are in: preservation of good order is 
keeping things in that state which, in proportion 
as it is good for the preservers, is bad for every 
body else” (Bentham, 1995: 112). Moreover, her 
analysis seems to indicate that the operation of 
political dynamics works only to justify the sta-
tus quo, and rarely if ever constitutes a basic part 
of daily social life in communities full of people 
trying to get things done. Lawson inds it proble-
matic that 
« ‘traditionalism’ can emerge and take on an expli-
citly ideological character that lends itself readily to 
instrumental manipulation »
and that 
« tradition exhorts its participants to an attitude of 
reverence and duty toward the practices and values 
that have been transmitted from the past. » (1996: 
17) 
his echoes much too closely those classic poli-
tical science attitudes describing 
« traditional society, in which vast masses live an 
unpolitical life, embedded in customs and usages they 
need not understand. » (Merckl, 1967: 208)
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deal of contemporary political life in the region. 
Despite the relative magnitude of most Paciic 
island nation-states’ bureaucracies, their govern-
ments are not particularly oppressive. his must 
in some measure be attributed to a widespread 
indigenous commitment to participatory politics 
– that is, traditional democracy.
Recent experience in Micronesia 
An array of colonial administrations have ruled 
the Micronesian islands. North of the equator, 
most of the island groups underwent successive 
rule by Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United 
States before achieving self-government and in-
dependence in the late twentieth century. Colo-
nial rulers were ambivalent and unsystematic in 
their dealings with the chiefs, sometimes prop-
ping them up and at other times undermining 
them. An as yet unpublished paper has underta-
ken a comparative study of these processes in six 
diferent cases under American rule in the years 
following World War Two, providing useful his-
torical perspective (Carucci et al., n.d.). 
In the Marshalls, for instance, the U.S. admi-
nistration established a Marshall Islands legisla-
ture. From the time it irst convened in 1950, the 
body found itself engaged in heated debate over 
land rights, with paramount chiefs’ claims “that 
as of right they owned all the land” set against 
commoners who were “stating that land was held 
in common.” Disagreement about who wields 
authority over land continues (Carucci et al., 
n.d.: 7). In the Federated States of Micronesia’s 
Yap state the government includes Councils of 
Traditional Leaders from both the island of Yap 
and from the outer islands, charged with matters 
of tradition and custom, areas which are broadly 
interpreted in contemporary life there. Many 
Yapese insist that their chiely councils exercise 
veto power over all legislation proposed in the 
Yap state legislature that they, the councils them-
selves, consider to lie within the realm of autho-
rity over tradition, and chiefs continue to exercise 
considerable inluence over who runs for elective 
oice. But on the whole, Carucci concludes, the 
chiefs’ roles remain in great lux (n.d.: 17)
Palau’s constitution recognizes traditional lea-
dership as possessing authority equal to constitu-
tional law. he national legislature consults with 
the Council of Chiefs; chiefs comment formally 
on government actions. 
« Legal arguments about the scope of traditional 
chiely power often rise to Palau’s Supreme Court 
[and] the two forms of governance are engaged in 
an ongoing dialogue and contest in managing Palau’s 
political life. » (n.d.: 20)
tic traditions that can provide a better basis for 
contemporary political institutions than those 
imported from the West” (1996: 27-28). She ex-
plicitly denies this possibility, however, insisting 
“those principles that irst gave democracy pride 
of place as the most desirable form of govern-
ment are largely absent in the political practice” 
of the countries she examines (1996: 30), and 
railing against 
« what some defenders of non-democratic systems 
in the South Paciic have done in promoting the vali-
dity of indigenous traditions against Western ideas 
about democracy. » (1996: 34)
From this perspective, it is specious to defend the 
political practices of these societies on grounds 
that they entail indigenous forms of democratic 
action or that they have the right to pursue their 
own political destinies regardless of what Wes-
terners think best for them.
Lawson is hardly alone in her analysis, nor am 
I in my critique. Among the persistent com-
plaints about shortcomings of the roles chiely 
politics continue to play in present-day Fijian 
government, we ind for example, Ratu Joni Ma-
draiwiwi, who bears a high title and has also ser-
ved as Fiji’s Vice President, observing that there is 
« little recognition or understanding by Fijians of 
the full implications of democracy » (2006: 295)
As I have argued, though, even scholars from so-
called democracies are themselves often unable to 
grasp the full implications of the political systems 
they tout. Vijay Naidu believes that in Fiji 
« Chiely hegemony has been jeopardised with the 
divisions between and within confederacies, the vying 
for power among ‘younger’ chiefs, widespread disputes 
over succession to chiely titles. » (2006: 300-301) 
But it may well be that divisions, rivalries, and 
disputes are the lifeblood of any viable political 
system. And as Stewart Firth observes, the call 
for improved 
« governance is part of a wider globalizing message 
preached by aid donors and international institutions, 
who see good governance as the best way to imple-
ment globalization and the free market, and who 
rather like to place the blame for failure not on global 
institutions but on national shortcomings in the deve-
loping countries. »(2006: 2)
here are in all these cases more complex pro-
cesses, and more conscious political action, than 
Lawson and others seem to think. I am by no 
means suggesting that tradition and democracy 
are synonymous in Paciic island political cultures, 
but any work that is framed in terms of tradition 
versus democracy is apt to misunderstand a great 
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a charter for a proposed new Micronesian na-
tion-state. he 1975 ConCon’s outcomes were 
decidedly mixed, relecting competing outlooks 
on the islands’ political status, and are only mar-
ginally relevant here. One item, however, is enti-
rely relevant, Article V, Section 3 of the 1975 
draft constitution speciied that 
« the Congress may establish, when needed, a 
Chamber of Chiefs. » 
he negotiations entailed in getting this item 
into the draft were intricate and marked by great 
ambivalence on the part of many of the dele-
gates. his draft was ultimately adopted as the 
Federated States of Micronesia’s constitution in 
1979, but tellingly, the fsm Congress did not 
opt to establish a chiely chamber.
In 1990 the fsm convened a second constitu-
tional convention (Petersen, 1993, 1994). One 
key proposed amendment was to establish (rather 
than merely allow establishment of ) the Cham-
ber of Chiefs (Petersen, 1997). As the convention 
progressed it became clear that there was conside-
rable opposition to the proposal. It was deferred, 
taken up and deferred again, then reconsidered, 
amended, and after much skilled negotiation it 
inally passed by a 27-1 vote. Opposition to it was 
initially mounted by both several state delegations 
and a number of individual delegates, but delegates 
were not merely divided among themselves in their 
Commenting on Micronesia as a whole, Carucci 
concludes
« Chiefdoms that remain efective in the modern 
context are not relics of the past, but systems that 
local people – as well as chiely elites – ind relevant 
and useful. his is not to say that melding tradition 
and modern governance is easy. Traditional authority 
today in the Paciic as elsewhere must engage with 
issues of human rights, voter equality, and women’s 
rights. While the chiely ideal emphasizes generosity 
and redistribution, the reality has changed. Transpa-
rency, nepotism, and corruption pose unique chal-
lenges when improprieties can be claimed as tradi-
tional rights. Yet Micronesia’s chiefs have also used 
their authority in the service of the community by 
inluencing public opinion and government policy. » 
(n.d.: 26)
A Micronesian Chamber of Chiefs 
he history of proposals to create an explicit 
constitutional role for Micronesian chiefs pro-
vides perspective on the Micronesians’ highly 
nuanced appreciation of checks and balances 
in their societies as a whole. In 1975, while the 
islands were still ruled by the United States as the 
Trust Territory of the Paciic Islands, a constitu-
tional convention assembled in Saipan to draft 
Photo 1. – he fsm national capital complex in Palikir, Pohnpei, constructed in the 1980s, incorporates materials re-
plicating the natural basalt columns used in the structures of Nan Madol, an ancient political center on Pohnpei, thus 
visually integrating traditional Micronesian forms with those of constitutional government (picture by the author)
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on a formal role in the national government would 
not only have enhanced their power, but decreased 
the dual character of the present-day Micronesian 
scene, which now functions with Congress on the 
one hand and traditional politics on the other. 
Keeping chiefs out of government seems to have 
been a deliberate means of preserving both their 
role as protectors of the people and the traditional 
structures of competing power blocs. For all that 
the FSM Constitution portrays itself as a guar-
dian of Micronesian customs and traditions, the 
Micronesian people see their guarantees situated 
elsewhere, and aim to keep them there. It is solely 
from this perspective, I think, that we can unders-
tand why it was only in Kosrae, where there are no 
chiefs, that a majority actually voted in favor of 
the Chamber of Chiefs, while in Yap, which most 
observers would agree has the most viable traditio-
nal polity and the only state government with an 
oicial role for chiefs already in place, the Cham-
ber received its greatest opposition. 
Conclusion
Micronesian societies share common his-
torical and cultural roots with Fiji and other 
eastern Oceanic communities. Chieftainship, 
land tenure, lineage structure, and the politics 
of everyday life are all closely entwined, and 
remain central to the survival of these new na-
tion-states. Conversion to Christianity, colonial 
rule, and struggles for autonomy, self-rule, and 
independence have brought substantial changes 
to local political dynamics, but have not erased 
patterns that developed and proved efective 
over the course of millennia. 
It is easy for political scientists and other scho-
lars, along with international aid agencies and 
political operatives, to ind fault in the processes 
of chiely governance. For reasons that are short-
sighted, chauvinistic, and perhaps narcissistic, too 
many observers tend to misunderstand democra-
cy and democratic processes, often attributing a 
certain magical purity and efectiveness to them. 
In the Politics, a work that has certainly stood the 
test of time, Aristotle argued that in and of itself 
democracy is not an especially viable form of go-
vernment. In his analysis, rather, the true value of 
democracy lies in the contributions it can make 
to mixed government, and held that it is in this 
combination of government by the one, the few, 
and the many that we ind what he calls a suc-
cessful government, that is a real “polity.” Modern 
democratic states incorporate the one (the execu-
tive), the few (a legislature), and the many (the 
electorate), and have proved viable and resilient, 
if hardly free from strife, and in contemporary Pa-
ciic island nation-states chieftainship constitutes 
a signiicant part of mixed governments.
attitudes toward the proposed Chamber; many 
were personally ambivalent, at times pressing for 
the Chamber and at other points voicing doubts 
about its potential to serve the Micronesian people. 
Opposition to the new Chamber was complex 
– there was palpable fear of the chiefs’ political 
inluence, but there was nearly equal desire to 
have them play a formal role in government as 
a check on the national congress. Delegates from 
every state, no matter what their position on the 
proposed amendment, insisted that no one in 
Micronesia – neither the Congress, the Conven-
tion, nor the people – could tell the chiefs what to 
do. But no one suggested that the chiefs would be 
inefectual, nor that they were irrelevant or ana-
chronisms. Rather, the crucial problem was the 
place that the chiely system itself should hold in 
the contemporary Micronesian political scene. 
Some very sophisticated points of view were 
expressed in testimony before the committee 
considering the proposal. he Chief Justice 
of Pohnpei State’s Supreme Court argued that 
the institution of chieftainship itself would be 
threatened if chiely roles were made subject to 
western legal precepts. It was exactly this sort of 
legislation, he said, that took away the powers of 
European monarchs. A Chuukese delegate poin-
ted out that codiication of chieftainship would 
be likely to freeze the relative rankings of titles, 
lineages, and clans in place and thus destroy the 
luidity that characterizes the entire system. 
he proposal was defeated overwhelmingly 
in the fsm’s 1991 Constitutional Referendum. 
Popular opposition to the Chamber of Chiefs, 
however, is evidence not of chieftainship’s decli-
ning signiicance in Micronesia, but of just the 
converse. he fact that in the traditional lea-
ders’ presence the ConCon delegates could not 
bring themselves to gainsay the chiefs exempli-
ies the dilemma. he chiefs retain tremendous 
inluence, of various types and springing from 
multiple sources. In general, Micronesian com-
munities have relied on the strengths of their 
chiefs to guarantee certain defensive functions 
– in relation to threats from both abroad and 
the supernatural world – and most people are 
thus inclined to support them. At the same time, 
however, people strongly resist any attempts 
on the part of the chiefs to interfere too much 
in the everyday, domestic sphere of commu-
nity life. Micronesians accomplish these dual, 
contradictory tasks with political structures in 
which various leaders, factions, and communi-
ties ceaselessly compete with one another and 
thus serve to check overweening ambition and 
unwarranted attempts to exercise power. 
As the entire thrust of the Chamber of Chiefs 
issue made clear, Micronesians have signiicant 
reservations about the power of their national 
government, generally perceiving the Congress as 
entirely too strong. Permitting the chiefs to take 
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It is possible, I suppose, to imagine that good 
government is peaceful government, free from tur-
moil. But this does not strike me as especially plau-
sible. Good government is a product of checks and 
balances, and of divisions of power, and depends 
on an element of struggle. Whether the procedures 
that organize productive opposition evolved in 
Westminster or were devised in Philadelphia, for-
mal democracy does not really difer that much 
from the structures of Micronesian, Fijian and 
other Oceanic polities. hey are all designed to be 
driven by opposition and competition, and compe-
tition begets cooperation; if they can do anything, 
chiefs and their people can, when necessary, coope-
rate. Chiefs, like any politicians, have been known 
to exploit and behave in ruthless fashion. But their 
status in their societies is in the end rooted in 
respect and afection, rather than the selish and, 
sometimes, seemingly mindless individualism that 
increasingly characterizes modern capitalist world-
views. Chiefs and chieftainship, as part of a mixed 
government, ofers the societies that retain them 
viable, humane, and familiar alternatives.
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